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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
Nature Of The Case 
 
 Neil G. Patterson appeals from the summary dismissal of his petition for post-
conviction relief.  He asserts that the district court erred by denying his request for 
counsel. 
 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
 
 Patterson filed a petition for post-conviction relief challenging his conviction for 
felony driving under the influence.  (R., pp. 4-7.)  Relevant to this appeal, he asserted 
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to “protect” him from “maliscious 
[sic] prosecution” and for coercing him to plead guilty.  (R., p. 6.)  The theory he 
presented was that the persistent violator enhancement charge violated his constitutional 
and statutory rights against double jeopardy, against self-incrimination, and to equal 
protection; that the enhancement should have been dismissed through a defense motion; 
and that his counsel was ineffective and coerced his guilty plea by not making the motion 
but instead securing dismissal of the enhancement through a plea agreement.  (R., pp. 8-
10.)  The remedies he sought were “release from incarceration,” “reduction of sentence,” 
and “restoration of prior parole status with revocation reversal.”  (R., p. 6 (capitalization 
altered).)  Patterson also moved for appointment of counsel.  (R., pp. 21-25.) 
 The state filed an answer to the petition (R., pp. 31-33), an objection to the motion 
for appointed counsel (R., pp. 28-30) and a motion to summarily dismiss the petition (R., 
pp. 26-27).  The state argued the petition failed to raise a material issue of fact, and that 
the claims asserted were “bare and conclusory, unsubstantiated by fact, procedurally 
defaulted, or clearly disproven by the record.”  (R., pp. 26, 34-54.)  The state’s objection 
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to the motion for appointment of counsel articulated the relevant legal standards and 
asserted that “Petitioner's allegations are frivolous and conclusory, cannot be developed 
into viable claims and would not be a proceeding that a reasonable person with adequate 
means would be willing to bring at his own expense and is therefore a frivolous 
proceeding.”  (R., p. 29.)   
Patterson filed responses to the state’s objection to the appointment of counsel 
and motion for summary dismissal.  (R., pp. 55-68, 80-87.)  Patterson stated generally, in 
response to the state’s objection to the appointment of counsel, that his “allegations can 
be developed into viable claims.”  (R., p. 59.)  In his response to the state’s motion for 
summary dismissal he reasserted his claim that the persistent violator enhancement 
violated his constitutional rights and therefore counsel coerced his plea by securing 
dismissal of that enhancement by plea agreement instead of by motion, arguing that a 
hearing should be held on his claim.  (R., pp. 62-67.)  In the course of making this 
argument he also asserted that “his counsel promised that with a guilty plea, he would be 
sentenced to a CAPP Rider and placed on probation following successful completion” but 
he was instead “placed in a traditional Rider” and his “sentence was imposed by the 
court.”  (R., p. 63.)  
The state replied to Patterson’s response to its motion.  (R., pp. 69-79.)  It 
addressed the new allegations regarding promises of attending CAPP and ultimately 
getting probation by providing the guilty plea questionnaire from the underlying criminal 
case, in which Patterson acknowledged that he understood the district court was not 
bound by the recommendations of the parties and could impose any sentence up to the 
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maximum.  (R., pp. 69-70, 76.)  Patterson sur-replied, addressing only the claim that the 
persistent violator enhancement charge violated double jeopardy.  (R., pp. 80-87.) 
The district court sustained the state’s objection to appointment of counsel and 
granted its motion for summary dismissal in one order.  (R., pp. 88-105.)  The district 
court characterized the issues as: 
1. Whether to grant the request for appointment of counsel. 
 
2. Whether to grant the request for the proceeding to be at County 
expense. 
 
3. Whether to grant [sic] the Petition for Post-conviction Relief. 
 
(R., p. 89.)  It addressed the issues in order, denying counsel, denying the request to 
continue at county expense, and summarily dismissing the petition.  (R., pp. 89-104.)  
Relevant to this appeal, the district court determined the claims that counsel coerced the 
guilty plea and misrepresented what retained jurisdiction program Patterson would be 
assigned to were “bare or conclusory, unsubstantiated by any fact” (R., pp. 97-98), were 
disproved by the record (R., pp. 98-99), and failed to state a claim (R., pp. 99-101).    
 The district court entered judgment (R., pp. 106-07) and Patterson filed a notice of 
appeal that was timely because of the mailbox rule and the Presidents’ Day holiday (R., 





 Patterson states the issue on appeal as: 
 Whether the district court abused its discretion by denying Mr. 
Patterson’s motion for appointment of post-conviction counsel based on 
its consideration of the substantive merits of his petition, rather than ruling 
on the motion for appointment of counsel first, as required by Idaho 
Supreme Court precedent. 
 
(Appellant’s brief, p. 4.) 
 
 The state rephrases the issue as: 
 
 Has Patterson failed to show that the district court erred by considering the merits 












 The district court applied the correct legal standards when it denied Patterson’s 
motion for appointment of counsel.  (R., pp. 89-92.)  Patterson argues that the district 
court “began its considerations with the substantive merits of Mr. Patterson’s claims, and 
after that, considered whether to grant his motion for appointment of post-conviction 
counsel in light of its conclusions on the substantive merits.  That is exactly the opposite 
of what it was supposed to do.”  (Appellant’s brief, p. 6.)  This argument fails on the law, 
which does not require a district court to determine whether claims are frivolous without 
regard for their merits.  Patterson also argues he asserted a non-frivolous claim that his 
plea was coerced by his counsel’s erroneous prediction that Patterson would be placed in 
the “CAPP rider program” and receive probation if he completed a successful rider.  
(Appellant’s brief, pp. 6-10.)  Patterson’s appellate argument is without merit. 
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
 The decision to grant or deny a request for court-appointed counsel lies within the 
discretion of the district court.  Charboneau v. State, 140 Idaho 789, 792, 102 P.3d 1108, 
1111 (2004). 
 
C. Patterson Has Shown No Error In The Denial Of His Motion For Appointment Of 
Post-Conviction Counsel 
 
 Post-conviction counsel should be appointed if the petitioner qualifies financially 
and “alleges facts showing the possibility of a valid claim such that a reasonable person 
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with adequate means would be willing to retain counsel to conduct a further investigation 
into the claim.”  Swader v. State, 143 Idaho 651, 655, 152 P.3d 12, 16 (2007); see also 
Charboneau, 140 Idaho at 793, 102 P.3d at 1112.  If the claims are so patently frivolous 
that there appears no possibility that they could be developed into a viable claim even 
with the assistance of counsel, the court may deny the motion for counsel and proceed 
with the usual procedure for dismissing meritless post-conviction petitions.  Workman v. 
State, 144 Idaho 518, 529, 164 P.3d 798, 809 (2007); Newman v. State, 140 Idaho 491, 
493, 95 P.3d 642, 644 (Ct. App. 2004). 
 The district court correctly articulated the legal standards applicable to the issue 
of appointment of post-conviction counsel.  (R., pp. 89-92.)  The court addressed the 
issue of appointment of counsel first, denying the motion for appointment of counsel for 
“the reasons stated herein.”  (R., p. 92.)  Addressing the issue of summary dismissal, the 
third issue presented, the district court determined the ineffective assistance of counsel 
claims were bare or conclusory, disproved by the record, and failed to state a claim.  (R., 
pp. 97-101.)  In its conclusion on all issues the district court stated it “denied the 
Petitioner’s request for the appointment of counsel because this Court determined the 
Petitioner’s claims were without merit.”  (R., p. 103.)  Application of the law to the 
pleadings in the record supports the district court’s order denying appointment of 
counsel.   
In order to prove a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a post-conviction 
petitioner must demonstrate both deficient performance and resulting prejudice.  
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984); State v. Charboneau, 116 Idaho 
129, 137, 774 P.2d 299, 307 (1989).  With respect to the deficient performance prong, the 
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United States Supreme Court has articulated the defendant’s burden under Strickland as 
follows: 
To establish deficient performance, a person challenging a 
conviction must show that counsel’s representation fell below an objective 
standard of reasonableness.  A court considering a claim of ineffective 
assistance must apply a strong presumption that counsel’s representation 
was within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.  The 
challenger’s burden is to show that counsel made errors so serious that 
counsel was not functioning as the counsel guaranteed the defendant by 
the Sixth Amendment. 
 
Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 104 (2011) (citations and quotations omitted).  To 
establish prejudice, a defendant must show a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s 
deficient performance, the outcome of the proceeding would have been different.  
Richter, 562 U.S. at 104.  When the alleged deficiency involves counsel’s advice in 
relation to a guilty plea, “in order to satisfy the ‘prejudice’ requirement, the defendant 
must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would 
not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.”  Hill v. Lockhart, 474 
U.S. 52, 58 (1985) (footnote and citations omitted). 
 Patterson’s claim that trial counsel was ineffective because he coerced Patterson’s 
guilty plea by not challenging the persistent violator enhancement through a motion but 
instead secured its dismissal through a plea agreement (R., pp. 8-10) is facially frivolous.  
See, e.g., Olsen v. State, 156 Idaho 922, 332 P.3d 834 (Ct. App. 2014) (persistent violator 
enhancement of DUI does not violate double jeopardy).  Likewise, as set forth in more 
detail below, the factual allegations asserted in his briefing that counsel “promised” that 
if he pled guilty he would be put in the CAPP program and would get probation if he 
successfully completed his rider (R., p. 63) fail to state a viable claim.  Patterson asserted 
no legally viable claim of deficient performance, his claims of deficient performance are 
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frivolous, and therefore the district court properly denied Patterson’s request for 
appointment of counsel. 
In addition, at no point did Patterson allege any prejudice or present any evidence 
thereof.  To the contrary, his pleading affirmatively disproved his desire to go to trial on 
the felony DUI charge.  In his petition the relief he requested was not a trial, but release 
from incarceration, reduction of sentence and reversal of his parole revocation (R., p. 6), 
a remedy that would leave his felony DUI conviction intact.  Moreover, Patterson was 
certainly not prejudiced by counsel’s failure to file frivolous motions challenging the 
persistent violator enhancement.   
Nor can there be any prejudice associated with counsel’s alleged predictions of 
what rehabilitative programming the Idaho Department of Correction would decide upon 
or what the district court would do in the future. Patterson entered his plea with 
knowledge that the district court was not bound by the parties’ recommendations and 
could impose up to the maximum sentence.  (R., p. 76.)  Knowledge that there may not be 
a retained jurisdiction disproves any reliance on counsel’s predictions of what would 
happen if a rider were ordered.  On this record, Patterson’s claims were also frivolous on 
the prejudice prong of the ineffective assistance of counsel standard. 
Patterson latches onto one sentence in the district court’s conclusion, that the 
court “‘denied the Petitioner’s request for the appointment of counsel because this Court 
determined the Petitioner’s claims were without merit.’”  (Appellant’s brief, p. 6 
(emphasis original) (citing R., p.103 (emphasis added)).) This statement, Patterson 
concludes, shows the district court “began its considerations with the substantive merits 
of Mr. Patterson’s claims, and after that, considered whether to grant his motion for 
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appointment of post-conviction counsel in light of its conclusions on the substantive 
merits. That is exactly the opposite of what it was supposed to do.”  (Appellant’s brief, p. 
9.)  This argument does not withstand scrutiny.   
The applicable standards provide that “a district court presented with a request for 
appointed counsel in a post-conviction action must address that request before ruling on 
the substantive issues in the case and errs if it denies a petition on the merits before ruling 
on the applicant's request for counsel.”  Judd v. State, 148 Idaho 22, 24, 218 P.3d 1, 3 
(Ct. App. 2009) (citing Charboneau, 140 Idaho at 792-94, 102 P.3d at 111-13).  This is 
what the district court did, considering appointment of counsel as the first issue it must 
address.  (R., pp. 89-90.)  The applicable standards do not require the district court to 
ignore the substantive merits of the claims in ruling on the request for counsel, or to 
consider those merits at any particular stage of analysis.  As stated by the Idaho Supreme 
Court, “clearly the standard permits the trial court to determine whether the facts alleged 
are such that they justify the appointment of counsel.”  Charboneau, 140 Idaho at 793–94, 
102 P.3d at 1112–13.  Patterson’s argument—that the district court erred because it 
“began its considerations with the substantive merits of Mr. Patterson’s claims” rather 
than first granting or denying the motion and only thereafter considering its relative 
merits—fails. 
 Patterson also asserts he alleged a potentially viable claim meriting the 
appointment of counsel when, in a brief in response to the motion for summary dismissal, 
he asserted that “counsel coerced his guilty plea” by “promising, as part of his sentence, 
he would participate in the CAPP rider program, and ultimately, be placed on probation, 
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but those promises were not fulfilled.”  (Appellant’s brief, p. 6 (citing R., pp. 6, 8-9, 63).)  
Review of Patterson’s cited legal authority shows this claim to be meritless. 
As legal support for his argument Patterson asserts that the Supreme Court of the 
United States has “recognized that trial counsel may perform deficiently by promising a 
particular sentence, and, if allegations that such a promise was made are true, the 
petitioner ‘is entitled to have his sentence vacated.’”  (Appellant’s brief, p. 7 (citing 
Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487 (1962)).)  The Machibroda case, however, 
does not by any fair reading stand for the proposition for which it is cited. 
 The facts in Machibroda were that the defendant filed a motion for relief based on 
a claim of unfulfilled promises regarding sentencing by the prosecutor: 
Specifically, the motion and affidavit alleged that on three separate 
occasions, identified as to time and place, an Assistant United States 
Attorney had promised the petitioner that he would receive a total prison 
sentence of not more than twenty years if he pleaded guilty to both 
informations.  These promises were said to have been made upon the 
authority of the United States Attorney and to be agreeable to the District 
Judge.  It was alleged that the petitioner had been cautioned not to tell his 
own lawyer about the conversations.  It was further alleged that when the 
petitioner threatened to advise his lawyer and the court of what had 
transpired, the Assistant United States Attorney had told him that if he 
‘insisted in making a scene,’ certain unsettled matters concerning two 
other robberies would be added to the petitioner's difficulties.  Finally, the 
motion and affidavit alleged that the petitioner had written two letters to 
the sentencing court and two letters to the Attorney General of the United 
States ‘relative to the misrepresentations' by the Assistant United States 
Attorney, to which he had received no reply. 
 
Machibroda, 368 U.S. at 489–90.  The Court noted that a “guilty plea, if induced by 
promises or threats which deprive it of the character of a voluntary act, is void.”  Id. at 
493.  The Court held that the district court violated federal statutory law by not holding a 
hearing on the claim but instead “made findings on controverted issues of fact without 
notice to the petitioner and without a hearing.”  Id. at 494.  The Machibroda case 
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addressed only when, under federal statutes, a court must conduct a hearing when a 
defendant files a motion claiming that his plea was induced by false promises by the 
prosecution, and simply does not stand for the proposition for which Patterson cites it.  
Neither its facts nor its holding are relevant here. 
 Patterson also relies upon Wellnitz v. Page, 420 F.2d 935 (10th Cir. 1970).  
(Appellant’s brief, p. 7 (citing the case with a “see, e.g.,” citation).)  The law applied in 
that case was set forth as follows: 
Certainly, if an attorney recklessly promises his client that a specific 
sentence will follow upon a guilty plea, or otherwise unfairly holds out an 
assurance of leniency in exchange for a confession of guilt, the question 
may arise whether such assurances were coercive, or whether such 
representation may be deemed constitutionally ineffective.  However, an 
attorney may offer his client a prediction, based upon his experience or 
instinct, of the sentence possibilities the accused should weigh in 
determining upon a plea.  An erroneous sentence estimate by defense 
counsel does not render a plea involuntary.  And a defendant's erroneous 
expectation, based on his attorney's erroneous estimate, likewise does not 
render a plea involuntary. 
 
Wellnitz, 420 F.2d at 936–37.  As set forth above, the proper legal standard in this case is 
the two-prong Strickland standard of deficient performance and prejudice.  Although it is 
beyond cavil that “recklessly promising his client that a specific sentence will follow 
upon his plea” can constitute deficient performance, and that waiving a trial the defendant 
would have insisted on but for the reckless promise can be prejudice, Patterson did not 
present a viable claim that this is what, in fact, happened.  
 Patterson presented no viable claim of deficient performance.  First, any 
“promis[e]” about what rider program Patterson would be put into is not a reckless 
promise of a “specific sentence.”  The choice of what programming to engage in during 
the retained jurisdiction period is decided by the Idaho Department of Correction and is 
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not part of the sentence.  See I.C. § 19-2601(4) (“during the period of retained 
jurisdiction, the state board of correction shall be responsible for determining the 
placement of the prisoner and such education, programming and treatment as it 
determines to be appropriate”).  Patterson has failed to show that his allegation counsel 
“promis[ed]” he would be placed in CAPP states a viable claim of deficient performance. 
 Second, any “promis[e]” about what the court would or would not do upon a 
successful rider is also not a promise of a “specific sentence.”  Rather, it is at best a 
prediction of what the court would do upon a specific set of facts occurring.  Patterson 
alleged “his counsel promised that with a guilty plea, he would be sentenced to a CAPP 
Rider and placed on probation following successful completion.”  (R., p. 63.)  He did not 
allege that he in fact was successful on his retained jurisdiction program, or that he was 
promised that he would ultimately end up on probation.1  In short, Patterson did not 
present a viable claim that counsel’s prediction of probation if Patterson successfully 
completed retained jurisdiction programming, even if presented as a “promise,” was 
deficient performance. 
 Patterson also presented no viable claim of prejudice.  At the time of the plea 
agreement Patterson filled out a guilty plea questionnaire.  (R., pp. 74-79.)  One of the 
questions asked whether his plea agreement was binding or not binding on the court.  (R., 
p. 76.)  Patterson circled the non-binding option, which stated he understood that the 
district court could impose any sentence up to the maximum, and if the district court did 
not follow the parties’ recommendations he would not have the right to withdraw his 
                                            
1 Compare R., p. 63 (alleging counsel told him he would be “placed on probation 
following successful completion” of CAPP (emphasis added)) with Appellant’s brief, p. 6 
(characterizing allegations as promising he would, “ultimately, be placed on probation”).   
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plea.  (R., p. 76.)  Patterson’s knowledge that the district court had discretion to impose 
any sentence it found appropriate, up to the maximum, disproves Patterson’s unmade 
claim that he would have chosen to go to trial but for counsel’s alleged promise IDOC 
would put him in CAPP and the district court would order probation upon its successful 
completion. 
 Patterson, citing Murray v. State, 156 Idaho 159, 166–67, 321 P.3d 709, 716–17 
(2014), acknowledges that a record of the underlying criminal proceedings showing a 
petitioner’s awareness of rights deficiently omitted from trial counsel’s advice can 
establish a lack of prejudice.  (Appellant’s brief, pp. 9-10.)  In Murray the Idaho Supreme 
Court held that the record of the plea proceedings in the criminal case “conclusively 
establish[ed]” that Murray understood the rights he was waiving as a result of the plea 
agreement, and therefore was not prejudiced by his attorney’s allegedly inadequate 
explication.  Murray, 156 Idaho at 167–68, 321 P.3d at 717–18.  Patterson argues that the 
district court erroneously found the record disproved prejudice in this case on the basis 
that in Murray, unlike in this case, there was a transcript of the guilty plea proceedings.  
(Id.)  However, a transcript is not a prerequisite to a record that disproves post-conviction 
allegations.  Grant v. State, 156 Idaho 598, 605, 329 P.3d 380, 387 (Ct. App. 2014) 
(“Grant's claim of ineffective assistance is disproved by his guilty plea advisory forms.”).  
Patterson offers no explanation how his acknowledgement to the district court of his 
awareness that, under the plea agreement, the district court may impose any sentence up 
to the maximum does not negate any possible claim of prejudice. 
 The district court applied the correct legal standards and denied the motion for 
counsel as the first issue it considered.  Patterson has failed to show error in the court’s 
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consideration of the merits of his claims when determining them to be frivolous.  He has 
also failed to show the possibility of a viable claim based on statements Patterson 
included in a brief in opposition to the motion for summary dismissal.  Patterson has 




 The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the district court’s order 
denying appointment of counsel and summarily dismissing the petition. 
 
 DATED this 25th day of August, 2017. 
 
 
      _/s/ Kenneth K. Jorgensen____________ 
      KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 
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